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Dispute Settlement Provisions in ASEAN’s External Economic Agreements with China, 
Japan and Korea 
 
Henry Gao 
gaohenry@gmail.com 
(forthcoming in Pasha L Hsieh & Bryan Mercurio (eds.) ASEAN Law in the New Regional 
Economic Order, Cambridge University Press, 2018) 
I. Introduction 
 
Since its inception in 1967, ASEAN has helped to enhance not only the political cooperation 
of its member countries, but also the economic integration among the members. In addition to 
promoting internal collaboration, another important task of ASEAN is to strengthen its ties 
with countries outside of the region. Over the years, ASEAN has signed many agreements 
with other countries. Among them, the agreements with its three big neighbors up north, i.e., 
China, Japan and Korea (CJK) are especially noteworthy due to ASEAN’s troubled history 
with Japan and China. This started with the Japanese invasion during the Second World War, 
followed by the Chinese efforts to export revolution in the 1950s and 1960s by supporting 
communist parties and training soldiers for guerilla wars, as well as the Sino–Vietnamese 
War in 1979. With such unpleasant experiences, it was no surprise that ASEAN countries 
viewed the big powers from north with suspicion. Indeed, one of the primary objectives for 
the founding of ASEAN in 1969 was to fend off the threat from other powers and “ensure 
their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation”.1 Given 
such historical background, the fact that ASEAN is willing to conclude agreements with CJK 
countries provides strong testimony to ASEAN’s commitment to regional integration.  
 
In recent years, CJK countries have emerged as the largest trade partners of ASEAN 
countries. For example, since 2010, China has been the largest trade partner of ASEAN, 
while Japan and Korea are the third and fifth largest. 2  Taken together, their total trade 
accounts for more than 30% of ASEAN’s external trade. With such strong and increasingly-
close economic ties, it is very important for ASEAN to maintain good relationships with CJK 
countries. In this regard, the international agreements provide the necessary platform for 
ASEAN to manage their trade relations with CJK countries. Moreover, as CJK countries are 
the biggest trade partners of ASEAN, ASEAN’s trade agreements with them also provide 
good indications on how ASEAN manages its relationship with its trade partners.  
 
Thus, this chapter will focus on ASEAN’s trade agreements with CJK countries. In particular, 
we will concentrate on the dispute settlement mechanisms in these agreements. Compared 
with the dispute settlement mechanisms within ASEAN’s internal agreements, the dispute 
settlement mechanisms of ASEAN’s external economic agreements provide the real litmus 
test in assessing the success of ASEAN’s in building a rule-based regime for the following 
                                                             
1  1967 ASEAN Declaration, adopted by the Foreign Ministers at the 1st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 
Bangkok, Thailand on Aug. 8, 1967.  
2  The 2010 data are available at Table 20: Top ten ASEAN trade partner countries/regions, available at 
http://www.asean.org/images/2012/resources/external_trade/Table20_27.xls. The latest available data is for 
2015, available at http://asean.org/storage/2016/06/table20_as-of-30-Aug-2016-2.pdf.  
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reasons:   
 
First, the external economic agreements provide a way to test the ability of ASEAN to 
respond to the pressures of larger, more powerful partners. The internal agreements are 
negotiated among ASEAN members, thus are less susceptible to power politics as the 
disparities among the members are relatively small. In contrast, the partners in ASEAN’s 
external economic agreements are mostly big regional players or even global players, thus 
highly likely to apply strong pressures against ASEAN countries in the negotiations for the 
external agreements. Unless the ASEAN countries are able to stand together and resist such 
demands, the external economic agreements will be subject to heavy influences by the 
external partners. That is also why according to the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 
Blueprint 2025, one of the main areas of implementation of the Blueprint is “strengthening 
ASEAN’s relationship with its external parties.”3 In that regard, studying the structure and 
design of the external economic agreements can tell us a lot about whether ASEAN countries 
can withstand external pressures.  
 
Second, as these agreements are negotiated by ASEAN as a whole, they are also quite 
different from the trade agreements negotiated by individual ASEAN members. Negotiating 
the individual agreements is much easier as the particular ASEAN member can decide on its 
own. In comparison, when ASEAN countries negotiate agreements with external partners on 
a collective basis, they have to first negotiate among themselves in order to form a common 
position, then negotiate with the external parties to shape the agreements. On issues that are 
particularly difficult, they might have to go back and forth between external partners and 
ASEAN internal members before they can finalize their position. This is also confirmed in 
the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint 2015, which states that one of the 
strategic measures of ASEAN’s global engagement is to “[d]evelop a more strategic and 
coherent approach towards external economic relations with a view to adopting a common 
position in regional and global economic fora”. 4  Therefore, these external economic 
agreements also provide valuable insights on how well ASEAN can work as a whole and 
speak with a unified voice.   
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. First, the paper conducts a detailed critical 
analysis of the dispute settlement mechanisms in ASEAN’s external economic agreements 
with CJK countries by reviewing the main procedural rules of these mechanisms. Next, the 
paper discusses the difference among these agreements, and compares them with the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement mechanisms. In the last part, the paper 
concludes with thoughts on how these dispute settlement mechanisms might evolve in the 
future, especially in view of the ongoing negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP).   
 
II. Dispute Settlement Provisions in Economic Agreements 
 
                                                             
3 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint 2015, para. 1.  
4 Id., para. 80.1.  
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In general, the dispute settlement provisions in political agreements tend to be weak and 
informal, while those in trade agreements are usually much stronger and formal. In addition, 
while political agreements typically offer consultation or negotiation as the only means of 
dispute settlement, trade agreements offer the parties a variety of dispute settlement 
mechanisms, with the highly-institutionalized WTO-style arbitration panel as the dominant 
model.  
 
Japan included dispute settlement mechanisms as a chapter in its Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership Agreement with ASEAN, while China and Korea each includes in their respective 
FTA packages with ASEAN a separate agreement on dispute settlement mechanisms (DSM). 
Their other economic agreements simply state that any dispute under these agreements shall 
be resolved through the procedures and mechanism as set out in the DSM agreement.5 But 
there are some notable exceptions. For example, Article 8 of the 2009 Memorandum of 
Understanding between ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Intellectual 
Property states that disputes shall be settled “amicably through mutual consultation or 
negotiation among All Participants through diplomatic channels, without reference to any 
third party or international tribunal”. 6  Similarly, article 5.1.2 of the 2005 Framework 
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation among ASEAN and Korea explicitly 
carved out trade in services and investment from the coverage of the DSM Agreement. These 
provisions reflect the reluctance of the parties to enforce non-traditional trade issues such as 
services, investment and intellectual property rights. 
 
A. Typical dispute settlement procedure  
 
In general, the dispute settlement procedures in CJK countries’ agreements are very similar to 
the one under the 2004 ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
(EDSM),7 which in turn is modeled after the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the 
WTO. This section discusses the main stages of dispute settlement in these dispute settlement 
mechanisms. It not only notes the common elements of these procedures, but also discusses 
their main differences with the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and the EDSM. These 
analyses provide key insights into the designs of these mechanisms and the rationales behind 
them. 
 
1. Consultations 
 
Consultations in essence are bilateral negotiations. Because they are conducted directly 
                                                             
5  See e.g., art. 19 of the 2006 Protocol to Amend the Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework 
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China; art. 
5.1 of the 2005 Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation among the Governments of 
the Member Countries of ASEAN and the Republic of Korea; art. 19 of the 2006 Agreement on Trade in Goods 
under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation among the Governments of the 
Member Countries of ASEAN and the Republic of Korea.  
6 Emphasis added by the author. 2009 Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of the Member 
States of ASEAN and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Cooperation in the Field of 
Intellectual Property.  
7 2004 ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3229609 
 4 
 
 
between the disputing parties without the involvement of third parties, it is usually easier to 
solve the disputes through consultations and that is why they are included in both non-
economic and economic agreements. The difference between the two, however, is that the 
consultation provisions in the non-economic agreements tend to be rather general and do not 
include detailed instructions while the ones in the economic agreements are much more 
specific. They usually set out in detail the format, content, and time limit for the consultation 
process. This is in marked contrast to the loose language in political agreements and reflects 
the legalistic nature of the economic agreements.  
 
Similar to the WTO DSU, a party may file a request for consultations against a measure by 
another party that nullifies or impairs the benefits accruable to the complaining party under 
the covered agreements.8 The request shall be submitted in writing to the responding party, 
and shall include the specific measures at issue, as well as the factual and legal basis, such as 
the provisions of the covered agreements allegedly breached.9  
 
Interestingly, none of the three DSMs recognize non-violation complaints, i.e., nullification 
or impairment caused by a measure that does not violate the WTO agreements.10 The China 
DSM made this explicit by stating that “[n]on-violation disputes are not permitted under this 
Agreement”.11 The other two DSMs do not include such explicit prohibition on non-violation 
complaints. However, as they only recognize nullification or impairment caused by measures 
which are inconsistent with a party’s obligation, or failure of a party to carry out its 
obligation,12 we can infer that non-violation complainants are implicitly excluded. In the view 
of the author, non-violation complainants are mainly designed to deal with the problems of 
unforeseen developments caused by imperfect treaty drafting. For a large international treaty 
like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), it is impossible to have all the 
parties discuss whether such unforeseen developments should be allowed due to the high 
transaction cost. In contrast, for bilateral treaties like the CJK-ASEAN economic agreements, 
the transaction cost is much lower. Thus, it is much better for the parties to solve the problem 
through bilateral consultations in such cases rather than trying to force the case through the 
dispute settlement mechanism.  
 
Upon receipt of the request for consultations, the respondent shall reply to the request within 
seven days and enter into consultations within thirty days.13 The parties shall conduct the 
consultations with good faith and make every effort to reach a mutually satisfactory solution.  
                                                             
8 Art. 4.1, 2004 Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive 
Economic Co-Operation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of 
China (“China”); art. 3.1, 2005 Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism under the Framework Agreement 
on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation among the Governments of the Member Countries of ASEAN and 
the Republic of Korea (“Korea”); art. 62.1, 2008 Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Partnership among 
Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Japan (“Japan”).  
9 China, art. 4.2; Korea, art. 3.2; Japan, art. 62.2.  
10 See art. XXIII.b of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994; art. XXIII.3 of General Agreement on 
Trade in Services.  
11 China, Footnote 1 to art.4.1.  
12 Korea, art. 3.1; Japan, art. 62.1.  
13 China, art. 4.3; Korea, art. 3.3; Japan, art. 62.3. Note that the deadline to reply to the request is 10 days under 
the Japanese DSM.  
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As consultation is conducted on a bilateral basis, the disputing parties might be reluctant to 
provide information for fear that such information might be used against them in later 
proceedings. To alleviate such concern, the DSMs explicitly require the parties to provide 
sufficient information to enable a full examination of how the measure might affect the 
operation of the covered agreement. At the same time, to avoid the misuse of the information, 
the parties are also required to treat information provided by the other party as confidential. 
To enable frank discussions, the consultation process is also confidential and without 
prejudice to the rights of the parties under other proceedings. If consultations fail to settle the 
dispute within sixty days, the complainant may request for the establishment of the panel.  
 
In case of urgency, such as those concerning perishable goods, the time periods for starting 
and ending consultations are shortened to one-third of the original time periods, i.e., ten days 
and twenty days respectively. This provision is of particular importance to ASEAN, which 
export many tropical fruits that are easily perishable.  
 
While the economic agreements do not make this explicit, consultation seems to be the 
mandatory first-step in the dispute settlement procedure. This conclusion is drawn from the 
provisions on the establishment of the arbitral tribunal, which can only be requested by the 
complaining party in any of the three scenarios: if the respondent fails to respond to the 
consultation request or enter into consultations in time; or if the consultation fails to resolve 
the dispute after a certain period.14 
 
2. Establishment of arbitral tribunal/panel 
 
Upon the delivery of the request for the establishment of the panel, the panel shall be 
established automatically. As the arbitration panels are not standing bodies, they need to be 
composed on an ad hoc basis for each specific dispute. Normally, there are three members in 
the panel. Two of them are appointed by the complainant and respondent respectively, while 
the third – the chair - has to be agreed by the two parties. If any party fails to appoint its 
arbitrator within the time period provided for under the DSM, the arbitrator appointed by the 
other party shall be the sole arbitrator. As I mentioned below, this is an important change 
compared to the WTO DSU and solves the problem caused by the blockage of the process 
through refusal to appoint a panelist by a party, especially the respondent. If the parties 
cannot agree on the third arbitrator, they may request the Director-General of the WTO to 
appoint an arbitrator. If the Director-General is a national of one of the disputing parties, the 
Deputy Director-General or the officer next in seniority who is not a national of either party 
shall be requested to make the appointment. This provision is a good innovation as there is a 
real possibility of a national of the parties serving as WTO Director-General, such as dr. 
Supachai.  
 
To ensure the competence of the panel, the DSMs requires panelist to “have expertise or 
experience in law, international trade, other matters covered by the covered agreements or the 
                                                             
14 China, arts. 4.3 & 6.1; Korea, arts. 3.3 & 5.1; Japan, art. 64.1.    
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resolution of disputes arising under international trade agreements”.15 Given the dominance 
of the state in international trade affairs in most ASEAN and CJK countries, this requirement 
means that most panelists are probably government officials. Indeed, this seems to be 
consistent with the practice of these countries in the WTO, as they tend to nominate 
government officials to the indicative list for panelists. The problem with having government 
officials as panelists, however, is that they normally rule along the lines of official national 
policy. To prevent this problem, the DSMs also state that a panelist “shall be chosen strictly 
on the basis of objectivity, reliability, sound judgment and independence and shall conduct 
himself or herself on the same basis throughout the course of the arbitral panel 
proceedings”.16 Stricter rules apply to the Chair, who “shall not be a national of any party to 
the dispute and shall not have his or her usual place of residence in the territory of, nor be 
employed by, any party to the dispute nor have dealt with the referred matter in any 
capacity”.17  
 
For the purpose of calculating the time periods under the DSM, the date of the establishment 
of the panel shall be the date on which the chair is appointed, or the 30th day after the receipt 
of the request for establishment of panel in case of a sole-member panel.  
 
3. Panel proceedings    
 
Once the panel has been composed, it shall fix the timetable for the panel proceedings.18 To 
assist the panel, the DSMs also include annexes which set out the rules and procedures of the 
panel proceedings in detail. Of course, after consulting the parties, the panel may adopt 
additional rules and procedures for specific disputes.19 
 
In general, the panel will hold two substantive meetings with the parties. Before each 
substantive meeting, the parties shall submit written submissions to the panel and the other 
disputing parties. The first round of submissions starts with the submission from the 
complaining party, which usually use this opportunity to substantiate its case by presenting 
the facts and making the legal arguments in more detail. This submission also helps the 
responding party to understand the factual and legal bases of the complaint, and to respond to 
them in its own submission. At the first substantive meeting, the complainant will present 
their arguments first, followed by the respondent. After the meeting, the parties shall submit 
another round of written submissions to rebut the arguments made by the other parties. These 
rebuttals will be presented at the second substantive meeting of the panel.  
 
The submissions of the parties shall be kept confidential and made available only to the 
parties to the dispute and the panel, but there are two exceptions: first, a party is not 
precluded from disclosing its own position or the submission to the public; second, if a party 
submits a confidential version of a written submission, it shall provide a non-confidential 
                                                             
15 China, art. 7.6; Korea, art. 6.6; Japan, art. 65.6.  
16 Id. 
17 China, art. 7.6; Korea, art. 6.6; Japan, art. 65.2. 
18 China, art. 9.3; Japan, art. 68.7.  
19 China, art. 9.5; Korea, art. 10.1; Japan, art. 68.2.  
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summary at the request of the other party to the dispute for disclosure to the public.  
 
In addition to the written submissions and oral statements by the parties, the panel may also 
seek information from the parties by posing questions either in writing or orally.20 Moreover, 
the panel may seek additional information on the case from any person or institution.21 In 
particular, the panel may seek advice on technical or scientific issues from experts.22 Of 
course, such experts do not have the power to vote in respect of any decision to be made by 
the panel. In the interest of fairness, such information shall also be made available to the 
parties.  
 
Given the language differences among the parties, the DSMs also explicitly require the panel 
proceedings and the documents submitted to the panel to be in English.23   
 
After the substantive meetings, the panel shall meet to deliberate on the case and draft the 
report based on the written submissions and oral presentations of the parties, as well as 
additional information and expert advice it gathers from other sources. The deliberations shall 
be kept confidential24 and the report shall be drafted without the presence of the parties to the 
dispute.25 As the function of the panel is to make an objective assessment of the dispute 
before it, including an examination of the facts of the case and the applicability of and 
conformity with the covered agreements, the panel report shall address both the factual and 
legal issues. In general, the report shall set out findings of facts and law together with 
reasons, including the applicability of particular provisions of the covered agreements to the 
current dispute as well as whether the parties have failed to carry out its obligations under the 
current agreements.26  
 
During deliberation and drafting of panel report, the members of the panel might disagree on 
certain issues. In such cases, the panel shall attempt to reach a decision by consensus or a 
majority vote if consensus could not be reached.27 In the latter case, the panelist who is not in 
the majority might decide to write a dissenting opinion. However, even in such case, the 
opinions of individual panelists shall be made on an anonymous basis.28   
 
Following deliberation, the panel shall first issue an interim report or draft award setting out 
its findings and conclusions for review by the disputing parties.29 The parties may comment 
on both the factual and legal aspects of the report and their comments shall be addressed by 
the panel in its final report.  
 
                                                             
20 China, Rule 5, Rules and Procedures for the Arbitral Proceedings; Japan, art. 67.2.  
21 China, Rule 8; Korea, art. 13.1; Japan, art. 67.3.  
22 China, Rule 8; Korea, art. 13.2; Japan, art. 67.3.   
23 China, art. 14; Korea, art. 16. 
24 China, art 9.4. Korea, Rule 21; Japan, art. 68.10.   
25 China, art 9.6. Korea, Rule 17; Japan, art. 69.1.  
26 Korea, art. 11.2.  
27 China, art. 8.5. Korea, Rule 20; Japan, art. 69.7.  
28 China, art. 9.6; Korea, Rule 17;  
29 China, art. 9.7; Korea, Rule 18; Japan, art. 69.2. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3229609 
 8 
 
 
The final report shall be released to the disputing parties within 120 days from the date of the 
establishment of the panel. 30  The time period may be shortened in case of urgency or 
extended if the panel has difficulty in issuing its report in time. The report shall be made 
available publicly within 10 days of the release to the disputing parties.31  
 
To encourage the parties to seek a mutually satisfactory solution to the dispute, the panel may 
be suspended at any time before the issuance of the final report with the agreement of the 
parties.32 If a solution is found, the panel proceeding may be terminated.33 On the other hand, 
if the parties fail to reach a solution, the panel process may be resumed pursuant to the 
request of any party.34  
 
4. Implementation, compensation and retaliation   
 
If the panel finds against the respondent, the respondent is supposed to bring its measure into 
conformity with the panel report. However, the panel report might not specify how the panel 
recommendations shall be implemented. Instead, the parties are supposed to agree on the 
means to implement the recommendations. 35  Moreover, as it usually takes time for the 
respondent to change its measures through the domestic legislative process, the parties shall 
also agree on the reasonable period of time necessary for the respondent to implement the 
recommendations.36 If the parties cannot reach agreement, they may refer the matter back to 
the original panel, which shall assess the consistency of the means proposed by the 
respondent.37 If the parties disagree on whether or not the respondent has complied with the 
panel report, they may also refer the matter to the original panel for decision.38  
 
If the respondent fails to comply with the panel recommendations within a reasonable period 
of time, the complainant may request compensatory adjustment from the respondent in the 
form of tariff reductions on other products. 39  If the parties cannot reach agreement on 
compensation, the parties may request the original panel to determine the proper level of 
retaliation.40 As compensation and the suspension of concessions or benefits are temporary 
measures available in the absence of implementation,41 they shall only continue until such 
time as implementation has taken place.42  
 
5. Alternative dispute settlement mechanisms   
 
                                                             
30 China, art. 9.8; Korea, Art. 12.2; Japan, art. 69.6.  
31 China, art. 9.9. Korea, Art. 12.3; Japan, art. 69.9. 
32 China, art. 11.1; Korea, Art 8.1; Japan, art. 70.1.  
33 China, art. 11.2; Korea, Art 8.2; Japan, art. 70.2.  
34 China, art. 11.1; Korea, Art 8.1; Japan, art. 70.1. 
35 China, art. 12.2; Korea, art. 14.3.  
36 China, art. 12.2; Korea, art. 14.3. 
37 China, art. 12.2; Korea, art. 14.4. 
38 China, art. 12.3; Korea, art 14.5; Japan, art. 71.4.  
39 China, art. 13.2; Korea, art 15.2; Japan, art. 71.3.  
40 China, art. 13.3; Korea, art 15.3; Japan, art. 71.3.  
41 China, art. 13.1; Korea, art 15.1; Japan, art. 72.1. 
42 China, art. 13.6; Korea, art 15.6. 
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In addition to the normal dispute settlement process mentioned above, the three DSMs also 
included some alternative dispute settlement mechanisms. For example, all three DSMs 
include conciliation or mediation. In addition, the Korean and Japanese DSMs also include 
good offices. They shall only be undertaken if all the parties to the dispute agree to their use. 
They may be requested by any party, and they may start or terminate at any time. They may 
be pursued concurrently with the proceedings of the arbitral panel if the parties agree. These 
proceedings and the positions of the parties during such proceedings shall be confidential and 
without prejudice to the rights of the parties in any other proceedings. 
 
The DSMs do not provide detailed rules on how good offices, conciliation or mediation 
should work. As these provisions are copied from Article 5 of the DSU, the parties might 
wish to refer to the explanations provided by the Director-General of the WTO, which states 
that good offices shall consist primarily of providing physical support and Secretariat 
assistance to the parties; conciliation shall consist of good offices plus the further 
involvement of the Director-General in promoting discussions and negotiations between the 
parties; while mediation shall consist of conciliation plus the possibility of the Director-
General to propose solutions to the parties.43  
 
B. Differences among the DSMs 
 
As the Chinese and Korean DSMs take the form of stand-alone agreements while the 
Japanese DSM is a chapter in its FTA, one might think that the Japanese DSM is less detailed 
or legalistic than the other two. However, this is not the case as the provisions in the Japanese 
DSM are very similar to those in the other two.  
 
At the same time, there are still some important differences among the three mechanisms. 
First, the Korean DSM is much more detailed than the Chinese and Japanese DSMs. For 
example, while the establishment of the panel does not need the approval of all parties under 
all three DSMs, only the Korean DSM explicitly state that the panel shall be established 
automatically upon delivery of the request to establish a panel while the other two DSMs are 
silent on the issue.44 Similarly, while both the Chinese and Korean DSM provides that a new 
panel shall be established if the original panel is unable to conduct its work, only the Korean 
DSM provides that the new panel shall apply the same time frame as the original panel.45  
 
Second, the Korean DSM is more legalistic by providing more explicit guidelines on how to 
enforce certain obligations. For example, even if the respondent fails to implement the panel 
recommendations, both the Chinese and Japanese DSMs require the authorization from the 
panel before the complainant may retaliate.46 In contrast, the Korean DSM states that the 
complainant may retaliate by simply providing a written notice of retaliation to the other 
                                                             
43 Art. 5 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding: Communication from the Director-General, WT/DSB/25, 
July 17, 2001, Attachment B: Procedures for Requesting Action Pursuant to Article 5 of the DSU, footnote 15.  
44 Korea, art. 5.3.  
45 Compare China, art. 7.7 and Korea art. 6.7.  
46 See China, art. 13.3; Japan, art. 72.2 & 71.4.  
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parties.47 While the same provision also allows the respondent to request a panel to rule on 
the legitimacy of the retaliation, the Korean rule provides a much stronger incentive for the 
respondent to implement the panel recommendations as the burden of initiating the retaliation 
panel procedure is placed on the respondent rather than the complainant.  
 
C. Comparison with the WTO dispute settlement procedure 
 
In these dispute settlement procedures, we can find many influences from the WTO DSU and 
the EDSM. For example, the provisions on the terms of reference of the arbitral panel are 
copied verbatim from the WTO. Similarly, the provisions on compensation and suspension of 
concessions also originated from the DSU. Given the maturity of the WTO DSM, it is no 
wonder that it serves as a good model for the dispute settlement provisions in these 
agreements. 
 
At the same time, some of the DSU provisions seem to have been blindly copied into these 
agreements with little consideration on their suitability. One example is the provisions on 
interim report. The rationale for having such a step in the WTO DSM is probably to provide 
additional time for the parties to review the findings of the panel and decide whether or not to 
lodge an appeal. Without such a mechanism, the parties might not have sufficient time to 
digest the panel findings and make an intelligent decision within the 60-day period from the 
issuance of the final panel report and the submission of notice of appeal. As CJK countries’ 
economic agreements do not provide for the possibility of appeal, it is unclear what useful 
purpose such a mechanism would serve. Even worse, the provisions on the interim report 
could lead to two highly-undesirable consequences.  
 
First, it could result in the leakage of the interim report. While this frequently happens in the 
WTO,48 it does not cause problems as the panelists are usually not nationals of the disputing 
parties.49 In contrast, as the two non-chairing panelists in cases brought under CJK countries’ 
DSMs are appointed by the two disputing parties, they are very likely to be nationals of the 
parties, sometimes even the officials of these parties. Leaking the report will subject them to 
political pressure at home through their national governments, and this could undermine the 
integrity of the panel.  
 
Second, the parties could use the interim review to request a wholesale rewrite of the panel 
report. This has not happened in the WTO so far, because the DSU only allows the parties to 
request the panel to “review precise aspects” in the interim report.50 In its report in the 
Australian-Salmon case, the WTO Panel ruled that this means that the parties cannot request 
the panel to make sweeping changes to the report.51 Curiously, this language has not been 
                                                             
47 Korea, art. 15.3.  
48  Valerie Hughes, “The WTO Dispute Settlement System: A Success Story”, in Julio Lacarte and Jaime 
Granados eds., Inter-Governmental Trade Dispute Settlement: Multilateral and Regional Approaches 115 
(2004). 
49 This is prohibited by art. 8.3 of the DSU.  
50 Art. 15.2 of the DSU. See Hughes at 115.   
51 See Hughes, supra note 45, at 115. See Panel Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, 
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copied into CJK countries’ agreements. While this might simply be the result of an oversight 
in drafting, it could well open up the floodgate of abuse by the parties to these agreements.  
 
Another example is the provisions on suspension of benefits. As a form of self-help, this 
mechanism might not be useful for everyone. As explained by Valerie Hughes, if a 
developing country imposes high tariffs on imports from a non-complying developed country, 
the level of trade affected might be too small to cause hardship to the developed country, 
while the developing country itself might suffer due to the higher tariffs.52 Thus, such a 
measure has not been frequently used in the WTO. The same is true in the ASEAN-CJK 
context. CJK countries are much bigger trade powers compared with most ASEAN member 
countries, even though Korea and China are both developing countries. Thus, if CJK 
countries fails to implement any panel decision, the winning ASEAN member countries 
might not be able to effectively retaliate, making it difficult to secure compliance. 
Furthermore, under the WTO, it is possible for the winning Member to suspend concessions 
in other sectors, especially services trade and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Under the ASEAN-CJK agreements, however, 
retaliation is practically limited to goods trade as there are no substantial concessions on 
services and TRIPS. This further limits the utility of suspension of concessions. There are two 
possible ways to solve the problem: the first is the introduction of collective retaliation, 
which allows all ASEAN members to retaliate against their bigger neighbors from the north. 
The second is monetary compensation, whereby the winning party does not have to worry 
about any potential back-firing of retaliatory measures. However, as there are no precedents 
from the WTO, ASEAN might face substantial resistance from CJK countries in introducing 
such innovative mechanisms in the agreements. 
 
Of course, this does not mean that the drafters of CJK countries’ agreements simply copied 
the DSU without making any changes. To the contrary, a few provisions have been either 
deleted or modified by CJK countries’ agreements. The most conspicuous among them is the 
absence of a provision on an appellate mechanism in CJK countries’ agreements. This makes 
sense as CJK countries’ agreements are unlikely to generate a significant number of disputes 
to justify the establishment of a standing appellate tribunal.  
 
Another change made by CJK countries’ agreements is the number of panelists. Under the 
DSU, each panel is usually composed of three panelists but the number may be expanded to 
five.53 In contrast, while CJK countries’ agreements also set the default panelist number at 
three, the panel could also include only one panelist. Such variations reflect the different 
procedures for the appointment of panelists: Under the DSU, the panelists are proposed by 
the Secretariat and agreed by the disputing parties or appointed by the DG. Under CJK 
countries’ agreements, however, one panelist is named by each individual disputing party, 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
WT/DS18/R and Corr.1, adopted 6 November 1998, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS18/AB/R, 
DSR 1998: VIII, p. 3407, at para. 7.3.  
52 See Hughes, supra note 45, at 135. See also Julio Lacarte & Fernando Pierola, “Comparing the WTO and 
GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: What was accomplished in the Uruguay Round?”, in Lacarte & 
Granados eds., Inter-Governmental Trade Dispute Settlement: Multilateral and Regional Approaches 60 (2004).   
53 Art. 5.8 of the DSU.  
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with the third one to be agreed by the parties. Thus, under CJK countries’ agreements, the 
respondent could try to stalk the process by refusing to name its own panelists. To prevent 
this, CJK countries’ agreements state that the panelist appointed by the complainant shall be 
the sole panelist if the respondent fails to appoint someone within the deadline. Such a 
problem would not arise under the DSU, where all panelists have to be agreed by the parties 
and the DG will appoint the three members if the parties fail to agree, making it impossible to 
have only one panelist.  
 
The third change is on language, where CJK countries’ agreements explicitly state that 
English shall be the language used in the proceedings. This is an improvement over the DSU, 
where the requirement that the panel report shall be circulated only when it is available in all 
three official languages can lead to lengthy delays. 54  As there is no common language 
between CJK countries and ASEAN members, the use of English – a common second 
language of all countries - can help to make it easier to conduct the proceedings.  
 
The last change is on costs, where CJK countries’ agreements make the following 
arrangements: each party shall bear the costs of its appointed arbitrator; the costs of the Chair 
shall be born in equal parts by the parties to the dispute; other expenses of the panel 
proceedings shall be born in equal shares by the parties; and each party shall bear its own 
costs of participating in the dispute, including the legal costs.55 
 
With the exception of the last point, the cost arrangement under CJK countries’ agreements is 
completely different from that of the WTO, where costs of the panel and proceedings are 
borne by the WTO. Of course, this does not mean that the disputing parties do not have to 
pay anything at all. As the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is funded by the general 
operating budget of the WTO, each WTO Member, including the disputing parties, also 
indirectly contribute to the operating expenses of the DSM through its payment of the 
membership fee. Nonetheless, as the payment is not directly associated with the dispute 
settlement activities, there is a potential for a free-rider problem. In practice, however, this 
has not turned to be a major problem for the WTO, as most WTO cases are usually brought 
by or against the Members with bigger trade volumes. In CJK countries’ agreements, 
however, things are different. First of all, the members do not pay any membership fees. 
Furthermore, there is very little formal institutional structure handling the disputes. Thus, it 
makes sense to have the disputing parties contribute directly to the panel expenses.  
 
III. Concluding Thoughts and Reflections  
 
As we can see from our discussions above, the dispute settlement mechanisms in ASEAN’s 
external economic agreements with CJK countries are rather legalistic. This is quite different 
than the ones under its external political agreements, which usually prefers soft consultations 
over hard semi-judicial mechanisms.  
 
                                                             
54 Hughes, supra note 45, at 116.  
55 China, art. 15; Korea, art. 17; Japan, art. 73.  
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In practice, however, the difference in the styles of dispute settlement mechanisms between 
the economic and non-economic agreements might not matter much. After all, even though it 
is highly legalistic, the dispute settlement mechanisms in CJK countries’ economic 
agreements have never been used. In a way, this is not surprising, as dispute settlement 
mechanisms in most free trade agreements (FTA) around the world have rarely been used. 
Instead, most countries prefer to use the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to handle their 
disputes with another WTO Member even if both are members of an FTA with a well-
designed dispute settlement mechanism. The main reason for such preference is that the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism has developed rich jurisprudence on trade issues, and is thus 
more predictable and reliable. Moreover, as the membership of the WTO is much bigger than 
any FTAs, a ruling obtained through the WTO dispute settlement system can set the 
precedent in similar cases and deter other WTO members from adopting similar trade 
barriers. Thus, the difference in the dispute settlement mechanisms of the economic and non-
economic agreements might be of more theoretical rather than practical relevance.  
 
Moreover, the divergence in the approaches taken on economic and non-economic 
agreements might not always be the case, especially as ASEAN countries seem to be moving 
towards a more legalistic approach even for internal non-economic issues in recent years. The 
best example for this is the 2010 Protocol to the ASEAN Charter on Dispute Settlement 
Mechanisms (Hanoi Protocol), which provides for rather formalized and legalistic approach 
even for non-economic disputes.  
 
According to a commentator, it is based on the EDSM, which in turn is based on the DSU of 
the WTO.56 The author finds this view hard to agree. It is true that the Hanoi Protocol does 
indeed provide for consultations within a fixed timeframe, failing which the complainant may 
request the appointment of an arbitral tribunal.57 However, the decision-making rule for the 
establishment of tribunal/panel is very different under the two instruments. According to the 
Hanoi Protocol, the arbitral tribunal will only be established if the responding party explicitly 
agrees to the establishment of tribunal. 58  In contrast, the Vientiane Protocol adopts the 
reverse/negative consensus rule as under the WTO DSU, which means that the panel shall be 
established unless the Senior Economic Officers Meeting decides by consensus not to 
establish a panel.59  
 
Nonetheless, the Hanoi Protocol is still a big improvement over the rudimentary rules on 
dispute settlement under the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) and 
the 2007 ASEAN Charter, as it explicitly provides for the possibility of arbitration by a court-
like tribunal. Moreover, even though the establishment of the arbitral tribunal is subject to the 
consent of the responding party, no consent from the parties is required for the adoption of 
the arbitral award. Instead, once issued, the award of the arbitral tribunal shall be final and 
                                                             
56 See Walter Woon, “Dispute Settlement in ASEAN”, 1(1) The Korean J. Int’l and Comp. L. 100, 100-01 
(2013).  
57 Id., at 101.   
58 Hanoi Protocol, art. 8.3-4.  
59 Vientiane Protocol, art. 5.1.  
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binding on the parties to the dispute60 and the parties are explicitly required to comply with 
the award.61 In this respect, the Hanoi Protocol is even more legalistic than the Vientiane 
Protocol or the WTO DSU, as the panel reports under these two dispute settlement 
mechanisms still require the approval of the political bodies,62 even though one may argue 
such approval is only a matter of formality because they follow the negative consensus rule.  
 
As ASEAN is seeking to merge its economic agreements with CJK countries under the 
RCEP,63 the separate dispute settlement mechanisms under the individual agreements will 
need to be consolidated as well. Under the current agreements, each of CJK countries has a 
separate dispute settlement mechanism with ASEAN on a bilateral basis. When one of CJK 
countries has a dispute with the ASEAN countries, the other two CJK countries may not join 
the dispute settlement proceeding as co-complaints or third parties, but the other ASEAN 
countries may do so. In contrast, as the RCEP is a regional initiative, any of ASEAN’s 
external partners will be able to join the dispute between an ASEAN country and another 
external partner. This will change the dynamics of the dispute settlement process and make 
individual ASEAN countries subject to more political pressures from external partners when 
they are involved in trade disputes.  
 
To solve the problem, the author believes that ASEAN countries should use the opportunity 
of negotiating the RCEP to further strengthen the existing dispute settlement mechanism by 
making some structural changes. For example, ASEAN countries might consider changing 
the rule that each party nominates one panelist in a dispute as this would politicize the dispute 
settlement process. Instead, the panelists shall be chosen from RCEP member countries that 
are not parties to the dispute. For this purpose, ASEAN countries might consider establishing 
an indicative list of panelists, or better still, setting up a permanent panel body, which shall be 
composed of one panelist nominated by each country in the RCEP. When a dispute arises, 
three panelists who are not nationals of the parties to the dispute shall be assigned to 
adjudicate the case on a random basis. This will ensure that panelists from ASEAN countries 
get more experience in dispute settlement, and will help to establish a rule-based system for 
the RCEP.  
 
Also, under the current dispute settlement mechanisms, the costs of panel proceedings shall 
be split between the disputing parties. This might prevent smaller and poorer ASEAN 
countries from participating in dispute settlement proceedings as they do not have resources 
comparable to the non-ASEAN partners. ASEAN countries should propose changing it to the 
WTO model, i.e., a dispute settlement mechanism that is free for disputing parties and 
supported by the membership fees of member countries based on their respective trade 
volumes. This will help to alleviate the cost concerns for ASEAN members and make them 
more willing to participate in dispute settlement proceedings.  
 
                                                             
60 Hanoi Protocol, art. 15.1.  
61 Hanoi Protocol, art. 15.1 & 16.1.  
62 See Vientiane Protocol, art. 9.  
63 ASEAN Framework for Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (2012). 
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Of course, like any other dispute settlement mechanism, the success of the dispute settlement 
mechanisms in ASEAN’s agreements with its external partners ultimately depends on the 
political will of ASEAN countries and its partner countries. However, other things being 
equal, a well-designed dispute settlement mechanism could help to de-politicize trade 
disputes and foster the culture of respect for the international rule of law among ASEAN and 
its partners. In the long term, the international rule of law provides the best way for ASEAN 
to achieve its aim of “maintain[ing] the centrality and proactive role of ASEAN as the 
primary driving force in its relations and cooperation with its external partners in a regional 
architecture that is open, transparent, and inclusive”.64  
 
                                                             
64 ASEAN Charter, art. 1 sec. 15.  
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